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Abstract
We study how access pricing affects network competition when consumers’ sub-
scription demand is elastic and networks compete with non-linear prices and can use
termination-based price discrimination. In the case of a fixed per minute termination
charge, our model generalizes the results of Gans and King (2001), Dessein (2003)
and Calzada and Valletti (2008). We show that a reduction of the termination charge
below cost has two opposing effects: it softens competition and it helps to internalize
network externalities. The former reduces consumer surplus while the latter increases
it. Firms always prefer termination charge below cost, either to soften competition or
to internalize the network effect. The regulator will favor termination below cost only
when this boosts market penetration.
Next, we consider the retail benchmarking approach (Jeon and Hurkens, 2008)
that determines termination charges as a function of retail prices and show that this
approach allows the regulator to increase subscription without distorting call volumes.
Furthermore, we show that an informed regulator can even implement the first-best
outcome by using this approach.
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1 Introduction
In most countries in the world, there is more than one telecommunication network. There
is thus competition on the retail level for customers. In order to provide their customers
with the possibility to connect to subscribers from rival networks, network operators need
to cooperate in terms of terminating calls from rival networks. This requires agreement
over the termination charges: How much should operator A pay to operator B in case a call
originates from network A but terminates on network B? Since this termination charge enters
as a cost (for off-net calls), it affects competition in the retail market. Since each network is
basically a monopolist in the market for termination of calls directed to its own customers,
in the absence of any regulation, termination charges could be set inefficiently high.1 There
is thus a need to either regulate the termination charge or to have firms negotiate and
agree on some termination charge. The latter raises the concern whether the termination
charges firms would agree upon (namely the ones that maximize profits) are efficient from
a social point of view. Armstrong (1998) and Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) show that,
when firms compete in linear prices, bilateral agreements on termination charges lead to
monopolistic retail prices, even though there is retail competition. In contrast, Laffont,
Rey and Tirole (1998a) find that termination charges lose their collusive power when firms
compete in non-linear prices but without termination-based price discrimination, because of
a waterbed effect: higher usage prices lead to lower fixed fees. In fact, they show that profits
are completely independent of termination charge. This profit neutrality result seems to be
a knife-edge result, since some changes in the assumptions of the model may result in firms
preferring termination charges above or below termination cost.
In this paper, we study how access pricing affects network competition in a Logit model
in which consumers’ subscription demand is elastic, networks compete with non-linear prices
and can apply termination-based price discrimination. In this sense, we extend the models
of Gans and King (2001) (who consider inelastic subscription demand) and Dessein (2003)
(who does not allow for termination-based price discrimination). We study two very different
approaches to determine termination charges. First, we consider the standard approach
based on a fixed (per-minute) termination charge and study how the termination charge
affects profits and social welfare. We find that both the firms and the regulator want to depart
1This would certainly be the case for termination charges for international calls between two operators
in different countries. (See Carter and Wright, 1994.) The case is less clear for termination charges between
two networks who compete for the same customers. In any case, most national regulators are concerned
about too high termination charges and use the argument of significant market power in the market for
termination as a justification for intervention.
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from cost-based termination charge (and hence want to distort call volumes) in order to affect
consumer subscription. In particular, a reduction in termination charge creates two opposing
effects softening competition and internalizing network externalities: the former reduces
consumer subscription while the latter expands it. Depending on which effect dominates,
there can be conflicts or alignments of interests between the firms and the regulator regarding
whether they prefer termination charge below or above cost.
Second, we study the retail benchmarking approach that determines termination charges
as a function of retail prices. We extend the approach from the setting without termination-
based price discrimination and with inelastic subscription demand (considered in Jeon and
Hurkens, 2008) to the setting with termination-based price discrimination and with elastic
subscription demand. We show that for a given fixed (reciprocal) termination charge, we
can find a family of access pricing rules that induce firms to charge on-net price equal to
on-net cost and off-net price equal to off-net cost but the equilibrium fixed fee decreases with
the strength of the feedback from the retail prices to access payment. The result implies
that the regulator can increase consumer subscription without creating any distortion in
call volumes. Our access pricing rules intensify retail competition since a firm can reduce
its access payment to rival firms by reducing its average retail prices. The regulator can
also use the rule to maintain consumer subscription and reduce the distortion in call volume.
Such a rule would improve efficiency and firms’ profits. Furthermore, we show that when the
regulator and the firms have the same information about demand and cost structure, there
is a simple modification of our rule that achieves even the first-best outcome that maximizes
market penetration.
In the case of the standard approach, our innovation is to identify the interplay between
the two opposing effects. The result that termination charge below cost softens competition
is well-known and discovered by Gans and King (2001) in the context of termination-based
price discrimination with inelastic subscription demand: when termination charge is lower
than termination cost, on-net price is higher than off-net price and therefore consumers
prefer to belong to the smallest network all other things being equal, which reduces firms’
incentive to steal customers. Therefore, firms prefer termination charge below cost while the
regulator prefers termination charge equal to cost. Recently, Calzada and Valletti (2008)2
and Armstrong and Wright (2008)3 find the same result. In order to isolate the effect of
2They consider a Logit model with inelastic subscription (i.e. full subscription).
3They consider an extension of the Hotelling model that allows for elastic demand. Although they focus
on the case in which fixed to mobile termination charge and mobile to mobile termination charge are the
same due to arbitrage, when they study the case in which the two can be separately chosen, they find that
3
internalizing network externalities from the competition-softening effect, we first study a
benchmark of “two interconnected islands” in which each island is occupied by a monopolist
facing an elastic subscription demand. There is no competition between the two monopo-
lists since consumers cannot move from one island to another. In this benchmark, when a
monopolist attracts an additional customer, he creates a positive externality to the other
monopolist since the latter’s consumers can enjoy off-net calls to the additional customer.
Since the two monopolists fail to fully internalize these externalities, the total number of
subscribers is smaller than the number when both islands are occupied by one identical
monopolist. We find that firms prefer termination charge below cost in order to internalize
better the network externalities: a lower termination charge, by increasing the degree of
interconnection, increases each subscriber’s surplus from off-net calls (for a given number of
subscribers), which in turn induces each firm to expand their network size.4
In the Logit model with elastic subscription and competition, when termination charge is
equal to termination cost, there are two possible cases: the consumer surplus under duopoly
is either larger or smaller than the one under monopoly. In either case, firms would like to
choose termination charge in order to make the outcome of competition as close as possi-
ble to the outcome of one monopolist owning both networks. Therefore, in the first case,
firms want to decrease consumer surplus while, in the second case, they want to increase
consumer surplus. A rather surprising result is that in both cases, firms prefer having termi-
nation charge below cost. The reason is that consumer surplus is larger under duopoly than
under monopoly exactly when the business stealing effect dominates the network externality
effect, so that firms prefer to soften competition, which requires a low termination charge.
Consumer surplus is lower under duopoly than under monopoly, exactly when the network
externality effect dominates the business stealing effect. Thus firms prefer to internalize the
network effect better, which again requires termination charge below cost. The regulator
will always prefer larger consumer surplus so that in the first case it prefers to strengthen
competition by means of a termination charge above cost, while in the second case it favors
a termination charge below cost (in fact, in this case, the socially optimal access charge is
lower than the one preferred by the firms).
Our result in the standard approach based on a fixed termination charge is reminis-
cent of Dessein (2003)’s finding. Dessein considers a setting without termination-based
firms prefer mobile to mobile termination charge below termination cost (due to competition-softening effect
a` la Gans-King) while the regulator prefers the termination charge above the cost.
4To some extent, this effect is similar to the result of Katz and Shapiro (1985) that an increase in
compatibility among competing networks increases the total number of subscribers.
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price discrimination and with elastic demand and shows that firms again prefer to have a
termination charge below cost while the regulator prefers a termination charge above cost
when the business stealing effect dominates. However, since without termination-based price
discrimination, termination charges do not affect profits in the extreme case of inelastic de-
mand, he does not clearly disentangle the two opposing effects as we do. In contrast, with
termination-based price discrimination, there is only a business stealing effect in the extreme
case of competition with inelastic subscription (as in Gans and King (2001)) while there is
only a network externality effect in the other extreme case of two interconnected islands
(i.e., no competition with elastic subscription).
Most of the literature that addresses issues related to termination charges in two-way
access pricing, considers the termination charge as a fixed price per minute.5 When firms
compete in non-linear prices, any termination fee different from termination cost results in
inefficient prices. In this paper we depart from this literature and are interested in applying
a retail benchmarking approach to the issue of termination prices. In Jeon and Hurkens
(2008) we introduced this approach successfully in a framework without termination-based
price discrimination and with inelastic subscription demand where firms compete in linear or
in non-linear prices. We showed that benchmarking the termination charge a network has to
pay to its own average retail price provides firms with incentives to lower their average price
as it so reduces termination payments. We showed that by choosing the benchmarking rule
appropriately, a regulator can induce Ramsey prices, without having to know consumers’
demand function. In the current paper we extend our benchmarking rule to the case where
subscription demand is elastic and firms can charge different prices for on-net and off-net
calls.
We show that for a given fixed (reciprocal) termination charge, we can find a family
of access pricing rules parameterized by κ(≤ 1) such that all the access pricing rules in
the family induce firms to charge on-net price equal to on-net cost and off-net price equal
to off-net cost but the equilibrium fixed fee decreases with κ where κ = 0 corresponds to
the standard approach based on the fixed termination charge. The result implies that the
regulator can increase consumer subscription without creating any distortion in call volumes.
The regulator may also use the rule to maintain the number of subscriptions (and therefore
consumer surplus) and to reduce the distortion in call volume. Such a rule would improve
5See, for instances, Armstrong (1998), Armstrong and Wright (2008), Calzada and Valletti (2008), Carter
and Wright (1999, 2003), Dessein (2003, 2004), Gans and King (2000, 2001), Hahn (2004), Hermalin and
Katz (2001, 2004), Laffont, Marcus, Rey and Tirole (2003), Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a,b), Jeon, Laffont
and Tirole (2004), Valletti and Cambini (2005) and Wright (2002).
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efficiency and increase profits. Furthermore, we show that when the regulator and the firms
have the same information about demand and cost structure, there is a simple modification
of our rules that achieves the first-best outcome (i.e. firms charge prices just at costs and
consumer subscription is maximized).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the logit
model formulation of network competition with elastic subscription demand.6 In particular,
we explain how rational consumer expectations are formed. Expectations about network
size are important since consumers care about the size of each network when firms charge
different prices for on and off-net calls. In section 3 we characterize the unique symmetric
equilibrium in case of a fixed per minute termination charge close to cost. We show that
firms always prefer a termination fee below cost, thereby generalizing the results from Gans
and King (2001), Dessein (2003), and Calzada and Valletti (2008). The regulator prefers
termination cost below cost only when it is important to internalize the network externality
in order to boost market penetration. In order to disentangle the business stealing effect
from the network externality effect, we also analyze a model of two monopolistic networks
who each operate in their home country. Since these networks do not compete for the same
customers but do care about subscription rates in the rival country as it affects the value for
home subscribers, there is no business stealing effect in this model and we can explain more
clearly why low termination charges help firms to internalize the network externality better.
In section 4 we introduce the retail benchmarking approach and show it outperforms any rule
based on fixed, per minute, termination charges as we obtain always efficient usage prices
while fixed fees are reduced, which boosts market penetration. When network externalities
are important such an approach may even be preferred by the networks, because it helps
to internalize the network externality without distorting usage prices. In section 5 we show
that, if the regulator has the same information as the networks, a minor modification of
the benchmarking rule even induces the first best outcome, where all prices equal cost and
market penetration is maximized. Section six concludes.
6For an introduction of logit models see Anderson and de Palma (1992) and Anderson, de Palma and
Thisse (1992).
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2 The model
2.1 The Logit Model
We consider competition between two networks. Each firm i (i = 1, 2) charge a fixed fee
Fi and may discriminate between on and off-net calls. Firm i’s marginal on-net price is
written pi and off-net price is written pˆi. The total mass of consumers is normalized to 1.
Consumer’s utility from making calls of length q is given by concave and increasing utility
function u(q). Demand q(p) is defined by u′(q(p)) = p. The marginal cost of a call equals
c, termination cost equals c0 ≤ c. The reciprocal access charge is denoted a We define
v(p) = u(q(p))− pq(p). Note that v′(p) = −q(p).
The timing of the game is as follows:
First, firms i = 1, 2 choose simultaneously tariffs Ti = (Fi, pi, pˆi).
Next, consumers form expectations over the number of subscribers of network 1 (β1) and
network 2 (β2), with βi ≥ 0 and β1 + β2 ≤ 1. We assume all consumers have the same
expectations (and these are in principle functions of the tariffs). Given such expectations,
utility from subscribing to network 1 equals
V1 = β1v(p1) + β2v(pˆ1)− F1,
while subscribing to network 2 yields
V2 = β2v(p2) + β1v(pˆ2)− F2.
Finally, not subscribing at all yields utility V0. Define U1 = V1 + µε1, U2 = V2 + µε2, and
U0 = V0 + µε0.
The parameter µ > 0 reflects the degree of product differentiation. A high value of
µ implies that most of the value is determined by a random draw so that competition
between the firms is rather weak. The noise terms εk are random variables of zero mean and
unit variance, identically and independently double exponentially distributed. They reflect
consumers’ preference for one good over another. A consumer will subscribe to network 1 if
and only if U1 > U2 and U1 > U0; he will subscribe to network 2 if and only if U2 > U1 and
U2 > U0; he will not subscribe to any network otherwise. These probabilities are denoted by
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℘k. These probabilities are given by
℘1 =
exp[V1/µ]∑2
k=0 exp[Vk/µ]
,
℘2 =
exp[V2/µ]∑2
k=0 exp[Vk/µ]
,
℘0 =
exp[V0/µ]∑2
k=0 exp[Vk/µ]
.
2.2 Rational Expectations
For expectations to be rational, we need βi = ℘i. For any price schedules T1, T2 such self-
fulfilling expectations exist as these are fixed points of the mapping f : ∆2 → ∆2 where
f(β) = (℘1, ℘2). The fixed point is unique as long as µ is sufficiently high. This can be
shown by looking at the index of zeros of the mapping g(β) = f(β)− β. The Jacobian of g
is
Dβg =
 1µ [β1(1− β1)v(p1)− β1β2v(pˆ2)]− 1 1µ [β1(1− β1)v(pˆ1)− β1β2v(p2)]
1
µ
[β2(1− β2)v(pˆ2)− β1β2v(p1)] 1µ [β2(1− β2)v(p2)− β1β2v(pˆ1)]− 1
 .
Let d = detDβg. For large enough µ, d > 0 so that the Jacobian is non-singular. This
implies that for large enough µ rational expectations are uniquely defined.
Theorem 1 For any pricing schedules (T1, T2) rational expectations exist. If detDβg > 0
for any rational expectation, rational expectations are uniquely defined.
A necessary condition for rational expectations to be unique is that the determinant is
positive at the symmetric equilibrium candidate (p, pˆ, F ) with per firm subscribers equal to
℘ ≤ 1/2. Let v = v(p) and vˆ = v(pˆ). The determinant can be rewritten in this case to be
equal to
d = (µ2 + 2µ℘((℘− 1)v + ℘vˆ) + ℘2(1− 2℘)(v2 − vˆ2))/µ2,
which can in turn be rewritten as
d = [µ− ℘(v − vˆ)][µ− ℘(v + vˆ)(1− 2℘)]/µ2 (1)
which is strictly positive (given that µ > 0) if and only if µ > ℘(v + vˆ)(1 − 2℘) and
µ > ℘(v − vˆ). In particular, this will be satisfied for any ℘ ∈ [0, 1/2] when vˆ ≈ v and
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µ > v/4. It is also satisfied for smaller values of µ as long as v ≈ vˆ and ℘ ≈ 1/2 or ℘ ≈ 0.
Also note that if p1 = p2 = pˆ1 = pˆ2 = c, but possibly F1 6= F2 (and thus β1 6= β2) then
d =
µ− (1− β1 − β2)(β1 + β2)v
µ
> 0
where the inequality follows when µ > v/4.
If expectations are not uniquely defined, one can potentially construct many equilibria
by having even the tiniest of deviations lead to expectations that jump, in the direction that
makes such deviations unprofitable. To avoid the existence of equilibria supported by such
jumping expectations, we will henceforth assume that µ > v(c)/4, where v(c) equals the
surplus when calls are priced at marginal cost. This is sufficient and necessary for unique
rational expectations to exist when access charge is close to c0.
Assumption 1 µ > v(c)/4.
Note that
DF1g =
 −β1(1− β1)/µ
β1β2/µ
 .
This implies that an increase in the fixed fee of network 1, everything else equal, will decrease
the number of subscribers to network 1 and will increase the subscribers to network 2.
However, a change in F1 also affects expectations and the total effect on the number of
subscribers by a change in fixed fee F1 is given by the implicit function theorem as
DF1β = −[Dβg]−1DF1g.
One thus verifies that
∂β1
∂F1
=
−1
dµ2
β1((1− β1)µ− β2(1− β1 − β2)v(p2)) (2)
and
∂β2
∂F1
=
−1
dµ2
β1β2(v(pˆ2)(1− β1 − β2)− µ). (3)
A special case of interest will be where both firms charge marginal cost c for on-net and
off-net calls, i.e., p1 = p2 = pˆ1 = pˆ2 = c. In this case we have
∂β1
∂F1
=
−β1((1− β1)µ− β2(1− β1 − β2)v(c))
µ− v(c)(β1 + β2)(1− β1 − β2)
(4)
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and
∂β2
∂F1
=
β1β2(µ− v(c)(1− β1 − β2))
µ− v(c)(β1 + β2)(1− β1 − β2)
. (5)
Summing up the previous equations, one obtains
∂(β1 + β2)
∂F1
=
−β1(1− β1 − β2)
µ− v(c)(β1 + β2)(1− β1 − β2)
< 0.
Market penetration thus decreases when one firm increases its fixed fee. The firm increasing
its fixed fee loses subscribers. Whether the rival firm loses or gains subscribers depends on the
sign of ∆ = µ−v(c)β0 where β0 = 1−β1−β2 denotes the number of unsubscribed consumers.
If ∆ > 0, the rival firm gets more subscribers while if ∆ < 0, it gets less subscribers. For
instance, in the extreme case of full subscription (i.e. β1 + β2 = 1), ∆ = µ > 0 since
there is only a business stealing effect: all consumers who leave firm 1 subscribe to firm 2. In
contrast, when subscription is voluntary, an increase in the fixed fee of firm 1 will lead to some
consumers switching to firm 2 and some consumers becoming unsubscribed. If consumers
do not immediately adjust their expectations, the proportion of all the consumers that leave
firm 1, and then go to firm 2 (rather than becoming unsubscribed), is proportional to β2/β0.
Once consumers realize that the value of being subscribed is reduced because there are
more unsubscribed consumers, some of the subscribers of firm 2 will become unsubscribed.
So firm 2 gains some subscribers due to the business stealing effect, but also loses some
subscribers due to the network externality effect. Clearly, if β0 is relatively large, a relatively
large fraction of consumers leaving firm 1 will become unsubscribed, so that the network
externality effect becomes large. In order to see whether the net effect is positive or negative,
note that, in the Logit model log(β2)− log(β0) = (V2 − V0)/µ. This implies that (when all
usage prices are c)
β2 = β0 exp[((1− β0)v − F2 − V0)/µ].
The derivative of the right-hand side with respect to β0 equals (1 + β0(−v/µ)) exp[((1 −
β0)v− F2 − V0)/µ], which is positive if and only if ∆ = µ− (1− β1 − β2)v > 0. We will say
that there is a net business stealing effect if ∆ > 0 and there is a net network externality
effect if ∆ < 0.
At a symmetric equilibrium candidate β1 = β2 = ℘ we have
∂℘1
∂F1
=
−℘
dµ2
[(1− ℘)µ− ℘(1− 2℘)v] ,
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and
∂℘2
∂F1
=
−℘2
dµ2
[vˆ(1− 2℘)− µ] .
It will be convenient for later purposes if we already denote the effect on the total number
of subscribers with respect to an increase in the fixed fee of one of the networks, at the
symmetric equilibrium candidate:
∂℘1
∂F1
+
∂℘2
∂F1
=
℘(−1 + 2℘)
µ− ℘(1− 2℘)(v + vˆ) < 0. (6)
In a symmetric equilibrium candidate T = (p, pˆ, F ), rational expectations thus require
the following relation between fees and number of subscribers per firm:
℘ =
exp[(℘(v(p) + v(pˆ))− F )/µ]
2 exp[(℘(v(p) + v(pˆ))− F )/µ] + exp[V0/µ] . (7)
3 Competition with fixed per minute termination charge
Let us now consider the case with a constant reciprocal access fee a. Write R(p) = (p−c)q(p).
Note that the number of subscribers ℘i and ℘j depend on V0 and tariff schedule T1, T2. We
will omit arguments. Profit can be written as follows
Πi = ℘i[℘iR(pi) + ℘jR(pˆi) + Fi − f ] + ℘i℘j(a− c0)(q(pˆj)− q(pˆi)). (8)
Firm i maximizes profits by setting Ti, holding Tj constant. Note that a change in marginal
price pi or pˆi while holding Fi fixed will affect the number of subscribers to i as well as of j.
For example, a decrease in price will make network i more attractive and will thus attract
some subscribers of j and will also attract some consumers who previously did not subscribe
to any network. This then makes it also more attractive to subscribe to network j relative to
staying unsubscribed, because of the network effect. It will be convenient to apply a change
of variables and let network i maximize profits by choosing pi, pˆi, and ℘i, holding pj, pˆj and
Fj fixed. This can be done since there is a monotonic relationship between Fi and ℘i since
∂℘i/∂Fi < 0.
Note that, at the fixed point, one has
℘i
1− ℘i =
exp [Vi/µ]
exp[Vj/µ] + exp[V0/µ]
,
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so that
Fi = ℘iv(pi) + ℘jv(pˆi)− µ log
[
℘i
1− ℘i (exp[Vj/µ] + exp[V0/µ])
]
.
Holding everything but pi and Fi fixed, one obtains
∂Fi/∂pi = ℘iv
′(pi).
Similarly, holding everything but pˆi and Fi fixed, one obtains
∂Fi/∂pˆi = ℘jv
′(pˆi).
Note that if pi is changed while keeping ℘i, pˆi, pj, pˆj and Fj fixed, then also ℘j will
remain fixed. Maximizing with respect to on-net price pi (keeping ℘i fixed) thus yields
0 =
∂Πi
∂pi
= ℘2i (R
′(pi) + v′(pi)) = ℘2i (pi − c)q′(pi).
Hence, pi = c. In words, on-net calls are priced at marginal cost.
Maximizing with respect to off-net price pˆi (keeping ℘i fixed) yields
0 =
∂Πi
∂pˆi
= ℘i℘j(R
′(pˆi) + v′(pˆi)− (a− c0)q′(pˆi)) = ℘i℘j(pˆi − c− a+ c0)q′(pˆi).
Hence, pˆi = c+ a− c0. In words, off-net calls are priced at perceived marginal cost (i.e. the
off-net marginal cost).
We thus obtain the standard ”perceived” marginal cost pricing result under non-linear
pricing.
Theorem 2 When access charge is set at a, firms will set on-net price equal to c and off-net
price equal to cˆ = c+ a− c0.
Given p1 = p2 = c and pˆ1 = pˆ2 = cˆ, profits can be rewritten as
Πi = ℘i[℘jR(cˆ) + Fi − f ].
Thus
∂Πi
∂Fi
=
∂℘i
∂Fi
[℘jR(cˆ) + Fi − f ] + ℘i[∂℘j
∂Fi
R(cˆ) + 1].
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So the first order condition reads
0 =
∂℘i
∂Fi
(Fi − f) + ℘i +R(cˆ)
(
℘j
∂℘i
∂Fi
+ ℘i
∂℘j
∂Fi
)
.
Solving for a symmetric solution, and using the marginal effects on the number of sub-
scribers of networks 1 and 2 with respect to a change in the fixed fee of network 1 (equation
(6)), yields
F − f =
−℘−R(cˆ) ℘2(−1+2℘)
µ−℘(1−2℘)(v+vˆ)
∂℘i
∂Fi
.
This can be manipulated to yield
F = f +
µ− (1− 2℘)℘(v + vˆ +R(cˆ))
(1− ℘)µ− ℘(1− 2℘)v (µ− ℘(v − vˆ)) =: F
equil(℘, a) (9)
On the other hand, rational expectations, by means of equation (7) determines the fol-
lowing relation between symmetric equilibrium fixed fee and equilibrium subscription:
F = ℘(v + vˆ)− V0 − µ ln
[
℘
1− 2℘
]
=: FRE(℘, a). (10)
The equilibrium number of subscribers per firm is thus found by solving F equil(℘, a) =
FRE(℘, a). We will denote this solution by ℘(a). In particular, for a = c0 the solution is
given by
[
f + µ
µ− 2℘(1− 2℘)v
(1− ℘)µ− ℘(1− 2℘)v
]
−
[
2℘v − V0 − µ ln
(
℘
1− 2℘
)]
= 0.
It can be shown (using µ/v > 1/4) that there is a unique solution ℘∗ = ℘(c0) to this equation.
There will then also be a unique solution for a 6= c0 for small enough |a − c0|. Moreover,
FRE(℘, c0) > F
equil(℘, c0) if and only if ℘ < ℘
∗. That is, the rational expectations curve
cuts the equilibrium curve from above.
Theorem 3 For |a−c0| small enough, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium (p, pˆ, F ).
This solution is given by p = c, pˆ = cˆ and F = FRE(℘(a), a).
We will be particularly interested in how profits, consumer surplus and total surplus vary
with a. It turns out that analyzing these effects is not straightforward since there are two
opposing effects at work. On the one hand, firms would want to use the termination charge to
soften price competition to raise fixed fees and profits. This is the only force at work in Gans
and King (2001) where subscription demand is inelastic. However, in the Logit model with
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elastic subscription demand there is a second force at work, namely network externalities.
Firms may have a common incentive to increase market penetration as this increases the
value of subscription to each customer. It is not obvious which of the two effects dominates.
Moreover, in the case the network externality effect dominates, it is also not clear whether
firms or the regulator would like to increase or decrease the termination charge. Therefore,
we analyze in the next subsection a model where only the network externality effect exists.
3.1 Two islands: the case of two interconnected monopolists
In order to provide more insight and intuition about how different access prices affect the
possibility to internalize network effects and how it affects competition, we present in this
section a model where firms do not compete with each other. There are two islands and
firm i (= 1, 2) operates only in island i. Each island has a population normalized to 1/2.
Inhabitants of an island cannot (or simply do not want to) subscribe to the operator of
the other island. Hence, the two firms do not compete for the same customers. However,
the inhabitants care indirectly about the pricing policy of the ”monopolist” on the other
island since it affects subscription rates and thus affects how many calls can be made to its
subscribers.
As before, consumers form expectations over the number of subscribers of network 1 (β1)
and network 2 (β2), with βi ≥ 0 and β1 + β2 ≤ 1. Given such expectations, utility from
subscribing to network 1 (for inhabitants of island 1) equals
V1 = β1v(p1) + β2v(pˆ1)− F1,
while subscribing to network 2 (for inhabitants of island 2) yields
V2 = β2v(p2) + β1v(pˆ2)− F2.
Finally, not subscribing at all yields utility V0. Define U1 = V1 + µε1, U2 = V2 + µε2, and
U0 = V0 + µε0. Consumers from island i subscribe (to network i) when Ui > U0 and remain
unsubscribed otherwise.
V1 and V2 are as before but now the number of subscribers on island i equals
℘i =
1
2
× exp[Vi/µ]
exp[Vi/µ] + exp[V0/µ]
.
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Rational expectations imply βi = ℘i. These are zeros of the mapping g˜(β) = (℘1 −
β1, ℘2 − β2). The Jacobian of g is now
Dβ g˜ =
 1µ [β1(1− 2β1)v(p1)]− 1 1µ [β1(1− 2β1)v(pˆ1)]
1
µ
[β2(1− 2β2)v(pˆ2)] 1µ [β2(1− 2β2)v(p2)]− 1
 .
Let d˜ denote the determinant of this Jacobian at a symmetric solution b = β1 = β2. Then
d˜ = [µ− b(1− 2b)(v + vˆ)][µ− b(1− 2b)(v − vˆ)]/µ2.
For large enough µ we have d˜ > 0 so then rational self-fulfilling expectations are unique.
Note that
DF1 g˜ =
 −β1(1− 2β1)/µ
0
 .
This implies that an increase in the fixed fee of network 1, everything else equal, will decrease
the number of subscribers to network 1 and will keep the number of subscribers to network
2 constant. The latter illustrates the fact that there is no business stealing effect in this
model. However, a change in F1 also affects expectations and the total effect on the number
of subscribers by a change in fixed fee F1 is given by the implicit function theorem as
DF1β(F1) = −[Dβ g˜]−1DF1 g˜.
One thus verifies that
∂β1
∂F1
=
−1
dµ2
β1((1− 2β1)(µ− β2(1− 2β2)v)
and
∂β2
∂F1
=
−1
dµ2
β1β2(1− 2β1)(1− 2β2)vˆ.
Thus, at a symmetric solution β1 = β2 = β
∂β1
∂F1
=
−1
dµ2
β((1− 2β)(µ− β(1− 2β)v) < 0
and
∂β2
∂F1
=
−1
dµ2
β2(1− 2β)2vˆ < 0.
Note that an increase of the fixed fee of firm 1 results in a decrease of the number of
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subscribers of firm 2. As before, firms will set variable price equal to perceived marginal
cost. Given p1 = p2 = c and pˆ1 = pˆ2 = cˆ := c+ a− c0, profits can be rewritten as
Πi = ℘i[℘jR(cˆ) + Fi − f ].
So the first order condition reads
0 =
∂℘i
∂Fi
(Fi − f) + ℘i +R(cˆ)
(
℘j
∂℘i
∂Fi
+ ℘i
∂℘j
∂Fi
)
.
Solving for a symmetric solution, and using the marginal effects on the number of subscribers
of networks 1 and 2 with respect to a change in the fixed fee of network 1, yields
F − f =
−℘−R(cˆ) −℘2(1−2℘)
µ−℘(1−2℘)(v+vˆ)
∂℘i
∂Fi
.
This can be manipulated to yield
F = f +
µ− (1− 2℘)℘(v + vˆ +R(cˆ))
(1− 2℘)(µ− ℘(1− 2℘)v) (µ− ℘(1− 2℘)(v − vˆ)) (11)
It is readily verified that the righthand-side of this equation is decreasing in a at a = c0:
∂RHS(11)
∂a
|a=c0 = −℘q(c)
µ− 2℘(1− 2℘)v
µ− ℘(1− 2℘)v .
To have rational expectations fulfilled we have
F = ℘(v + vˆ)−W0 − µ ln
[
2℘
1− 2℘
]
. (12)
Note that, at a = c0, the righthand-side of this equation is decreasing in a:
∂RHS(12)
∂a
|a=c0 = −℘q(c).
Hence, a marginal increase of a above c0 makes the rational expectations curve drop by
more than the equilibrium condition curve. This means that the number of subscribers goes
down when a is increased above c0.
Theorem 4 In the Logit model with two interconnected monopolists, an increase in the
termination charge above c0 lowers overall market penetration.
So if firms want to increase market penetration, they will want termination charge below
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cost. The intuition is that firms realize that raising ones fixed fee reduces the size of the
other networks and thus hurts its own customers. However, they fail to internalize the fact
that this also hurts the other network, and therefore they set a too high fixed fee. By having
a < c0, the value of making off-net calls is higher. This means that subscribers from the
second network care more about the size of the first network. An increase in the fixed fee of
network 1 will now thus reduce the size of the other network more than when a = c0. Hence,
letting a < c0 exacerbates the negative effect of raising ones fee on its own subscribers, and
firms thus lower the fixed fee and increase market penetration.
Do firms really want to increase market penetration? How does it affect profit and
welfare? To that end let us first investigate how profit is affected by a marginal increase
in ℘ (the number of subscribers of each network) above the equilibrium value ℘∗ (when a
is fixed at c0). Rational expectations have to be met, which means we are considering how
profits vary along the rational expectations curve. Note that at the equilibrium (at a = c0)
per consumer profit equals
F − f = µ(µ− 2℘
∗(1− 2℘∗)v
(1− 2℘∗)(µ− ℘∗(1− 2℘∗)v) .
The effect on total profit H(c0, ℘) = ℘ (F − f) with respect to a change in ℘ is thus
∂H
∂℘
(c0, ℘
∗) = H(c0, ℘∗)/℘∗ + ℘∗
[
2v(c)− µ
℘∗(1− 2℘∗)
]
=
℘∗v(µ− 2℘∗(1− 2℘∗)v)
µ− ℘∗(1− 2℘∗)v > 0
Hence, profits increase along the rational expectations curve, in a neighborhood around ℘∗.
Next, we have to account for the fact that when a is varied, the rational expectations
curve, and thus the equilibrium, will change. The partial effect on profits (keeping ℘∗ fixed)
equals
∂H
∂a
= (℘∗)2(a− c0)q′(cˆ),
so that at a = c0 a marginal change in a does not affect profits directly. The extra profit
made through access revenues is just offset by the decrease in the fixed fee. However, profits
are affected indirectly by a change in market penetration.
dH
da
= Ha +H℘ × ℘′(a) < 0.
One observes that profits are decreasing in a in a neighborhood around c0. Firms thus indeed
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prefer an access fee below cost. This leads to higher market penetration which means it is
also good for consumer and total welfare.
Theorem 5 Firms prefer access fee a < c0. This improves also consumer welfare.
To provide the intuition for the result, it is useful to note that the two monopolists would
like to achieve the outcome as close as possible to the outcome that would be chosen by a
monopolist operating in both islands. Given that the two monopolists do not fully internalize
network externalities, the number of subscribers is smaller than the one under a monopolist
operating in both islands. Therefore, they want to increase the subscribers by choosing an
access charge below the termination cost.
3.2 Interconnected duopoly
We now return to the case of competing interconnected duopolists. As explained before, the
case of interconnected duopolist exhibits both network externalities and business stealing
effects. We here analyze the effect of a change in termination charge around c0 for profits,
consumer welfare and total welfare.
We first analyze how an increase in a effects market penetration. Let us define h(℘, a) =
F equil(℘, a)− FRE(℘, a).
h(℘, a) =
µ− (1− 2℘)℘(v + vˆ +R(cˆ))
(1− ℘)µ− ℘(1− 2℘)v (µ− ℘(v − vˆ))− ℘(v + vˆ) +W0 + f + µ ln
[
℘
1− 2℘
]
.
We have already established that there is a unique solution ℘(a) of h(℘, a) = 0. Moreover,
at the solution h℘ > 0. Hence,
℘′(a) = −ha
h℘
has the opposite sign as ha.
∂h
∂a
(℘, c0) =
℘2q(c)
(1− ℘)µ− ℘(1− 2℘)v ((1− 2℘)v − µ).
We conclude that for ∆∗ = µ − (1 − 2℘∗)v > 0 an increase in a above c0 will increase
the equilibrium number of subscribers, while for ∆∗ < 0 such an increase in a results in a
decrease in the equilibrium number of subscribers.
Theorem 6 Let ∆∗ = µ− (1− 2℘∗)v.
d℘∗(a)
da
|a=c0 > 0 if and only if ∆∗ > 0
18
and
d℘∗(a)
da
|a=c0 < 0 if and only if ∆∗ < 0.
If ∆∗ < 0, then ∂℘2/∂F1 < 0. This means that an increase in network 1’s fixed fee
reduces the number of subscribers to network 2. In this case the network effect dominates
the business stealing effect. One would expect that firms then would prefer termination
charge below cost in order to boost market penetration. If ∆∗ > 0 the business stealing
effect dominates and one would expect firms again to prefer termination charge below cost,
in this case to reduce market penetration and to increase fixed fees and profits. We now
proceed to verify that indeed firms always prefer below cost termination charges, although
for different reasons.
Let H(a, ℘) denote the profit a firm makes when it has ℘ subscribers, access fee is a and
the fixed fee is given by FRE(℘, c0). That is
H(a, ℘) = ℘(℘R(cˆ) + F − f) = ℘(℘(R(cˆ) + v(c) + v(cˆ))−W0 − µ log[℘/(1− 2℘)]− f).
We will be interested in knowing what happens with this profit at a = c0 when ℘ is moved
away from the corresponding equilibrium value ℘∗. Note that we know that per consumer
profit at the equilibrium equals F − f , which by (9) equals (at a = c0)
µ
µ− 2℘∗(1− 2℘∗)v
(1− ℘∗)µ− ℘∗(1− 2℘∗)v .
Hence,
∂H
∂℘
(c0, ℘
∗) = H(c0, ℘∗)/℘∗ + ℘∗
[
2v(c)− µ
℘∗(1− 2℘∗)
]
= µ
µ− 2℘∗(1− 2℘∗)v
(1− ℘∗)µ− ℘∗(1− 2℘∗)v + 2℘
∗v − µ
1− 2℘∗
=
−℘∗(µ− (1− 2℘∗)v)(µ− 2℘∗(1− 2℘∗)v)
(1− 2℘∗)((1− ℘∗)µ− ℘∗(1− 2℘∗)v)
Hence, the sign of this derivative is opposite to the sign of ∆ = µ − (1 − 2℘∗)v. Thus, if
an increase of a above c0 increases market penetration, profits decrease with the number of
subscribers along the rational expectations curve. And if an increase of a above c0 decreases
market penetration, then profits increase with the number of subscribers along the rational
expectations curve, in a neighborhood around c0.
Next, we have to account for the fact that when a is varied, the rational expectations
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curve, and thus the equilibrium, will change. The partial effect on profits (keeping ℘∗ fixed)
equals
∂H
∂a
= (℘∗)2(a− c0)q′(cˆ),
so that at a = c0 a marginal change in a does not affect profits directly. The extra profit
made through access revenues is just offset by the decrease in fixed fee. However, profits are
affected indirectly by a change in market penetration.
dH
da
= Ha +H℘ × ℘′(a).
Since the sign of H℘ is the opposite of the sign of ℘
′(a) at a = c0, one observes that profits
are always decreasing in a in a neighborhood around c0. Firms thus always prefer an access
fee below cost.
Theorem 7 Firms prefer access fee a < c0.
How does total surplus change when the access fee is changed? Total surplus is the sum
of consumer surplus and industry profit. The expression for consumer surplus in the Logit
model has been derived by Small and Rosen (1981) as (up to a constant)
CS(a, ℘(a)) = µ ln
(
2∑
j=0
exp(Vj/µ)
)
= V0 − µ ln(1− 2℘(a)).
Hence, consumer surplus is not directly affected by the access charge, but only through the
equilibrium number of subscribers. Clearly, consumer surplus is increasing in the number of
subscribers:
∂ CS
∂℘
=
2µ
1− 2℘ > 0.
TS(a, ℘(a)) = CS(a, ℘(a)) + 2H(a, ℘(a)).
We thus obtain, at a = c0,
d TS
d a
= ℘′(a)CS℘ + 2Ha + 2H℘℘′(a)
= ℘′(c0)
(
2µ
1− 2℘ + 2
−℘(µ− (1− 2℘)v)(µ− 2℘(1− 2℘)v)
(1− 2℘)((1− ℘)µ− ℘(1− 2℘)v)
)
It can be established that the term in brackets is strictly positive when µ > v/4. This
means that total surplus is increased when market penetration is increased.
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Theorem 8 Let ℘∗ denote the number of subscribers per firm in the equilibrium when a = c0.
If µ > (1−2℘∗)v, the number of subscribers, and thus total surplus, increases as a is increased
above c0. If µ < (1− 2℘∗)v, the number of subscribers, and thus total surplus, increases as a
is decreased below c0: in this case, the socially desirable access fee is lower than the fee that
maximizes industry profit.
Both the firms and the social planner want to divert from the access charge equal to
termination cost in order to affect the number of subscribers. The firms want to make the
number of subscribers as close as possible to the number chosen by a monopolist owning
both networks while the social planner always wants to increase the number. When there is
a net business-stealing effect (i.e. ∆∗ > 0), there is a conflict of interest between the firms
and the social planner since the firms want to decrease the number of subscribers, which
requires them to choose a below c0 in order to soften competition. When there is a net
network externality effect (i.e. ∆∗ < 0), there is a congruence of interests between the firms
and the social planner in the sense that firms want to increase the number of subscribers,
which again requires them to choose a below c0 in order to internalize network externalities.
However, the firms do not internalize the positive effect that an increase in network has on
consumer surplus and therefore the socially preferred access charge is lower than the one
preferred by the firms.
4 Retail Benchmarking Approach
In this section, we generalize the retail benchmarking approach introduced in Jeon and
Hurkens (2008). Jeon and Hurkens (2008) consider the case without termination-based price
discrimination and with full participation of all consumers and find a class of access pricing
rules parameterized by κ that achieves the marginal cost pricing (i.e. the call charge equal
to c). We generalize the previous result in three dimensions. First, we allow for termination-
based price discrimination. Second, we consider a Logit model with elastic subscription
demand where full participation never arises. Third, in this setting, for a given fixed access
charge a, we find a class of access pricing rules parameterized by κ that induces each network
to choose the on-net price equal to the on-net marginal cost and the off-net price equal to
the off-net marginal cost.
Before generalizing the retail benchmarking approach, we remind the regulator’s infor-
mation constraint and the result from Jeon and Hurkens (2008).
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4.1 Assumption and Result from Jeon and Hurkens (2008)
We maintain the same constraint on the regulator’s information as in our previous paper:
• The regulator’s informational constraint : On the one hand, we assume that the regulator
has limited information about the market such that she is not informed about the individual
demand function q(p), each firm’s subscription demand function and the value of the fixed
cost f . On the other hand, she knows the marginal cost c and the termination cost c0.
Furthermore, she and consumers observe retail prices [(p1, p̂1, F1), (p2, p̂2, F2)]. Moreover, we
need to assume that the regulator can observe average retail prices,7 which means that she
is able to observe realized demand.
The firms are assumed to know all the relevant information regarding both the demand
and the cost sides as in Jeon and Hurkens (2008).
In a model without termination-based price discrimination and with full participation
of all consumers, we find that the following family of access pricing rules parameterized by
κ(< 1) induces each firm to adopt the marginal cost pricing (i.e. pi = c):
ai − c0 = κ
(
Fi + piq(pi)
q(pi)
− c
)
, (13)
where ai represents the access charge that firm i pays to each rival firm. According to the
rule, the mark-up of the access charge that firm i pays to each rival firm is equal to the
firm i’s average price mark-up multiplied by κ. We find that the retail benchmarking rule
intensifies retail competition such that higher values of κ translate into lower fixed fees.
However, that does not affect total surplus when all consumers subscribe to one of the two
networks, as we assumed in our previous paper.
4.2 Generalization
Consider a given fixed and reciprocal access charge a that can be different from c0. Let pii(a)
denote network i’s retail profit per customer gross of the fixed cost;
pii(a) ≡ ℘i(pi − c)q(pi) + ℘j(p̂i − (c+ a− c0))q(p̂i) + Fi
7For instance, the Spanish telecommunication agency (Comisio´n del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones)
publishes data on each network’s average price.
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Therefore, given the fixed access charge a, network i’s profit is given by
Πi = ℘i [pii(a) + ℘j(a− c0)q(p̂j)− f ]
We remind from the previous sections that in this case, network i finds it optimal to choose
pi = c and p̂i = c+ a− c0.
We now propose the following generalization of our access pricing rule: in addition to
paying the fixed (per-minute) access charge a, network i pays an access charge ai determined
by
aiq(p̂i) = κpii(a).
so that total termination charge equals
λ(a, κ) := a+ κ
pii(a)
q(p̂i)
. (14)
Under our generalized access pricing rule, network i’s profit is given by:
Πi = ℘i [pii(a) + ℘j(a− c0)q(p̂j)− f ] + ℘i℘j [−aiq(p̂i) + ajq(p̂j)] .
which is equal to
Πi = ℘i [pii(a) + ℘j(a− c0)q(p̂j)− f ]− κ℘i℘j [pii(a)− pij(a)] . (15)
Equation (15) shows well that our access pricing rules adds a sort of competition between
the two firms in terms of the profit per customer pii(a) such that the firm which extracts
more (less) surplus from consumers is punished (rewarded) in terms of the (additional) net
access payment. The intensity of this competition increases with κ. Rearranging (15) gives
Πi = ℘i [(1− κ℘j)pii(a)− f ] + κ℘i℘j [pij(a) + (a− c0)q(p̂j)] . (16)
As in the previous sections, we can apply a change of variables and let network i maximize
profits by choosing pi, p̂i and ℘i, holding pj, pˆj and Fj fixed. Note that if pi is changed
while keeping ℘i, pˆi, pj, pˆj and Fj fixed, then also ℘j will remain fixed. Note also that in a
Logit model, we always have ℘i < 1 and ℘j < 1. Therefore, for κ ≤ 1, maximizing Πi with
respect to on-net price pi (keeping ℘i fixed) is equivalent to maximizing pii. In other words,
as long as κ ≤ 1, κ does not affect the optimal choice of pi. Since we know from the previous
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sections that network i chooses pi = c when κ = 0, network i chooses pi = c for κ ≤ 1. For
the same reason, network i chooses p̂i = c+ a− c0 for κ ≤ 1. Therefore, the class of access
pricing rules induces networks to charge on-net price (off-net price) equal to on-net marginal
cost (off-net marginal cost).
We now study the equilibrium fixed fee. From pi = c and p̂i = c + a − c0, we have
pii(a) = Fi. Then, (15) becomes
Πi = ℘i [Fi + ℘jA(a)− f ]− κ℘i℘j [Fi − Fj] (17)
where A(a) ≡ (a − c0)q(c + a − c0). Equation (17) clearly shows that our access pricing
rule creates competition in terms of fixed fee: the firm charging a higher (lower) fixed fee
is punished (rewarded) in terms of the (additional) net access payment. Rewriting equation
(17) yields
Πi = ℘i [Fi − ℘j [κ (Fi − Fj)− A(a)]− f ] .
The first order derivative with respect to Fi is given by:
∂℘i
∂Fi
[Fi − ℘j [κ (Fi − Fj)− A(a)]− f ] + ℘i
[
(1− κ℘j)− [κ (Fi − Fj)− A(a)] ∂℘j
∂Fi
]
.
Solving for a symmetric solution yields:
F = f − ℘A(a)− ℘
∂℘i
∂Fi
[
(1− κ℘) + A(a)∂℘j
∂Fi
]
. (18)
From ∂℘i
∂Fi
< 0, F decreases with κ when a is close to c0. This is very intuitive since from (17),
the extra competition in terms of fixed fee, generated by our access pricing rule, becomes
more intensive as κ increases.
The equilibrium number of subscribers per firm is thus found by solving the system of
equations (18) and (10).
Theorem 9 Consider the retail benchmarking rules λ(a, κ) defined by (14). Then, for |a−c0|
small and any κ ≤ 1,
1. Each firm chooses on-net price equal to on-net marginal cost (c) and off-net price
equal to off-net marginal cost c+ a− c0). Hence, firm i’s profit per customer is equal to Fi.
2. The symmetric equilibrium is characterized by (18) and (10). In the equilibrium, the
fixed fee strictly decreases with κ.
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Corollary 1 From a social welfare point of view, the retail benchmarking approach domi-
nates the approach using a fixed reciprocal access charge for two reasons.
1. For a given fixed access charge, it is possible to increase the number of subscribers by
increasing κ from zero.
2. While in the case of fixed access charge, a distortion in off-net price is necessary
to increase the number of subscribers, in the case of retail benchmarking, it is possible to
increase the number of subscribers (by increasing κ from zero) while maintaining both on-net
and off-net call princes equal to the marginal cost c.
Basically, our retail benchmarking rule creates an extra policy instrument that is absent
in the fixed access charge approach. Namely, the social planner can increase the intensity of
retail competition by increasing κ the intensity of the feedback from retail prices to access
payment.
Furthermore, when there is a net network externality effect, it is also in the interest of
firms to have the retail benchmarking approach with a = c0 and with κ > 0. More precisely,
when a = c0, as the equilibrium fixed fee decreases with κ, there is κ
m > 0 such that the
equilibrium fixed fee for κ = κm is exactly equal to the fixed fee that would be chosen by
a monopolist owning both networks. On the other hand, if there is a net business stealing
effect, firms would like to have an access charge a˜ < c0 in order to soften competition.
However, there exists a retail benchmarking rule that allows the firms to make even higher
profits but leave consumer surplus unaffected. Namely, the regulator can choose a retail
benchmarking rule λ(a′, κ) with a˜ < a′ < c0 and κ < 0 such that both rules lead to exactly
the same market penetration and consumer surplus. Since the retail benchmarking rule leads
to less distorted call volumes, it is more efficient, leads to higher total surplus and thus also
to higher profits. Therefore,
Corollary 2 (i) When µ < (1− 2℘∗)v, the firms prefer the retail benchmarking approach
(14) with a = c0 and κ = min {κm, 1} to any fixed reciprocal access charge.
(ii) When µ > (1 − 2℘∗)v, firms prefer some fixed reciprocal access charge a˜ < c0 in
order to soften competition. However, the regulator can choose some rule λ(a′, κ) with
a˜ < a′ < c0 and κ < 0 such that both rules lead to exactly the same market penetration
and consumer surplus. The retail benchmarking rule leads to less distorted call volumes
and thus to higher profits.
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When a = c0, (18) becomes
F = f − ℘(1− κ℘)
∂℘i
∂Fi
.
At symmetric equilibrium, we have
∂℘i
∂Fi
= −℘
µ
(1− ℘)µ− ℘(1− 2℘)v
µ− 2℘(1− 2℘)v .
Therefore, we have
F = f +
µ(1− κ℘)(µ− 2℘(1− 2℘)v)
(1− ℘)µ− ℘(1− 2℘)v . (19)
Hence, if F > f for κ = 0, then F > f for κ ≤ 1. On the other hand, (10) is given by
F = 2℘v −W0 − µ ln
[
℘
1− 2℘
]
. (20)
Note that (20) does not depend on κ. The equilibrium (F, ℘) is determined by the two
equations (19) and (20). Clearly, as κ increases, the equilibrium (F, ℘) moves down following
the curve of (20) and therefore, the fixed fee decreases while the number of subscribers
increases.
4.3 Interpretation of the retail benchmarking rule
We now provide an economic interpretation of our access pricing rule. For this purpose, we
consider a = c0. Then, (14) is equivalent to
ai − c0 = κ(℘i + ℘j)
[
si
qoni
qoffi
(AP oni − c) + sj(AP offi − c)
]
+ κ(1− ℘i − ℘j) Fi
qoffi
(21)
where
si =
℘i
℘i + ℘j
, AP oni =
piq
on
i + Fi
qoni
, AP offi =
p̂iq
off
i + Fi
qoffi
.
In other words, si is firm i’s market share and AP
on
i (respectively, AP
off
i ) is firm i’s average
on net price (off-net price).
To explain the rule (21), we consider some specific cases. First, without termination-
based price discrimination and with full participation of consumers (i.e. ℘i + ℘j = 1),
we are back to the rule (13) that we considered in Jeon and Hurkens (2008). Therefore,
(21) generalizes (13) in two directions: termination-based price discrimination and partial
participation.
Second, under full participation but with termination-based price discrimination, (21)
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becomes
ai − c0 = κ
[
si
qoni
qoffi
AP oni + sjAP
off
i − c
]
In other words, our rule linearly links the access charge mark up to a weighted average retail
price mark up in which the average price is a weighted sum of on-net average price and
off-net average price and the weights depend on market shares (and are equal to market
shares if qoni = q
off
i ).
Third, under partial participation but without termination-based price discrimination,
(21) becomes
ai − c0 = κ(℘i + ℘j)
[
piqi + Fi − cqi
qi
]
+ κ(1− ℘i − ℘j)Fi
qi
Still our rule linearly links the access charge mark up to a weighted average retail price
mark up in which the weight used is either the fraction of subscribers or the fraction of
non-subscribers. For the subscribers, the average retail price markup is computed as usual
(piqi + Fi − cqi) /qi; for the non-subscribers, the average retail price markup is given by
putting the volume equal to zero in the numerator of the previous formula.
5 Retail Benchmarking Approach and First-Best
In this section, we assume that both the regulator and the firms have the same informa-
tion (i.e. all of them know demand and cost structures) and show that there is a simple
modification of our access pricing rule (14) that achieves the first-best outcome as a Nash
equilibrium. Our aim is not so much to promote this modified access pricing rule but to
illustrate the power of the retail benchmarking approach with respect to the approach based
on a fixed access charge. Note that the first-best outcome is achieved when the firms charge
the prices equal to the costs (i.e. pi = p̂i = c, Fi = f for i = 1, 2) and this outcome can not
be achieved under the approach based on a fixed access charge.
Let ℘FB be each network’s number of subscribers in the first best. In a Logit model with
duopoly, we have
0 < ℘FB < 1/2.
Since the regulator knows demand and cost structure, the regulator knows ℘FB. Define
κ∗ by 1 − κ∗℘FB = 0; hence κ∗ > 2. Let pii denote network i’s retail profit per customer
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gross of the fixed cost when a = c0;
pii ≡ ℘i(pi − c)q(pi) + ℘j(p̂i − c)q(p̂i) + Fi.
Then, for a = c0, the access pricing rule (14) is given by
(ai − c0) q(p̂i) = κpii (22)
We modify it as follows:
(ai − c0) q(p̂i) = κ∗max {pii, f} (23)
In (23), we choose κ = κ∗ and add the max operator such that firm i cannot realize any
further reduction of its access payment by pricing below costs. If i’s access payment does
not depend on its retail prices, firm i has no incentive to choose retail prices that give him
a retail profit per customer below the fixed cost per customer. However, under our retail
benchmarking approach, firm i may have an incentive to choose very low retail prices only
to reduce its access payment such that its net access revenue more than covers its net retail
loss. By adding the max operator, (23) makes such a deviation not profitable.
We now introduce one additional assumption:
Assumption 2 An increase in Fi increases the number of subscribers to firm j.
Assumption 2 is satisfied if µ is large enough. For instance, in a symmetric equilibrium
with pi = p̂i = c, it holds if µ > (1 − 2℘)v where ℘ is the number of subscribers to a
firm in the symmetric equilibrium. In other words, the assumption holds if there is a net
business-stealing effect.
Then, we have:
Theorem 10 Suppose that the regulator proposes the access pricing rule (23). Then, under
assumption 2, the first-best outcome can be implemented as a Nash Equilibrium: in the
equilibrium, firm i chooses pi = p̂i = c, Fi = f for i = 1, 2.
Proof. Suppose that firm j uses Fj = f, pj = p̂j = c. Then, we distinguish two cases
depending on whether ℘i > ℘
FB or ℘i < ℘
FB.
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Case 1: when ℘i > ℘
FB. ℘i > ℘
FB implies that pii < f . Then, firm i’s profit is
Πi = ℘i [pii − f ]− ℘i℘jκ∗ [f − f ]
= ℘i [pii − f ] < 0.
Case 2: when ℘i < ℘
FB. ℘i < ℘
FB implies, from assumption 2, 1 < ℘jκ
∗. Consider first
pii ≥ f . Then, firm i’s profit becomes
Πi = ℘i (1− ℘jκ∗) [pii − f ] ≤ 0.
Consider now pii < f . Then, firm i’s profit is
Πi = ℘i [pii − f ]− ℘i℘jκ∗ [f − f ]
= ℘i [pii − f ] ≤ 0.
6 Conclusion
We studied how access pricing affects network competition when consumers’ subscription de-
mand is elastic and firms compete with non-linear tariffs and can use termination-based price
discrimination. We first considered the standard approach based on a fixed and reciprocal
(per-minute) termination charge and found that both the firms and the regulator want to de-
part from cost-based termination charge (and hence want to distort call volumes) in order to
affect consumer subscription. In particular, two opposing effects (softening competition and
internalizing network externalities) are associated with a reduction in termination charge.
The former decreases consumer surplus while the latter increases consumer surplus. The
conflict and alignment of interests between the firms and the regulator in terms of preferred
termination charge can be explained in view of the two effects.
It is useful to note that firms would like to choose termination charge in order to make
the outcome of competition as close as possible to the outcome of a monopolist owning both
networks. When termination charge is equal to termination cost, there are two possible
cases: the consumer surplus under duopoly can be either larger or smaller than the one un-
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der monopoly. We called the first the case with a net business-stealing effect and the second
the case with a net network externality effect. Obviously, in the first case, firms want to
decrease consumer surplus, while in the second case, they want to increase consumer surplus.
A surprising result is that in either case, firms prefer having termination charge below cost.
The reason is that in the case of a net business-stealing effect, the softening-competition
effect dominates the effect of internalizing network externalities and hence decreasing ter-
mination charge below cost is preferred by firms. In contrast, in the case of a net network
externality case, the effect of internalizing network externalities dominates the softening-
competition effect and hence decreasing termination charge below cost increases consumer
surplus (and thereby expands consumer subscription). This suggests that in the first case,
the regulator prefers termination charge above cost while in the second case, the regulator
prefers termination charge below cost.
After studying the standard approach, we investigated the retail benchmarking approach.
Since our previous paper (Jeon and Hurkens, 2008) considered the case without termination-
based price discrimination and with inelastic subscription demand, this paper extended the
previous approach to a more realistic setting. In addition, we find that for a given reciprocal
fixed termination charge, we can find a family of access pricing rules parameterized such
that all the access pricing rules in the family induce firms to charge on-net price equal to
on-net cost and off-net price equal to off-net cost but the equilibrium fixed fee decreases
with the strength of the feedback from retail prices to access payments. The result implies
that the regulator can increase consumer subscription without distorting call volumes. Our
access pricing rules intensify retail competition since a firm can reduce its access payment
to rival firm(s) by reducing its retail prices. Furthermore, we show that when the regulator
and the firms have the same information about demand and cost structure, there is a simple
modification of our rule that achieves the first-best outcome (i.e. firms charge prices just at
costs and consumer subscription is maximized).
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